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     1  Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, U.S. District Judge for the District of Columbia,
sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 02-3873
MARGO L. ROYER,
Appellant
v.
PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
*TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 8
*(Dismissed Pursuant to Court’s Order of 7/23/03)
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(Dist. Court No. 00-cv-290J)
District Court Judge: Honorable D. Brooks Smith
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 5, 2003
Before: SLOVITER, ALITO, Circuit Judges, and OBERDORFER,1 District Judge.
(Opinion Filed: January 5, 2004)
2OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM:
I
Appellant Margo Royer challenges the District Court’s decision granting summary
judgment to her former employer on her Title VII claim that she was fired in retaliation
for complaining of sexual harassment.  We affirm because we agree with the District
Court that Pennsylvania State University (“the University”) articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for Royer’s termination and that Royer failed to present
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could reject the University’s explanation
for her termination.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05
(1973) (setting forth burden-shifting framework for evaluating discriminatory treatment
claims).  As we write only for the parties, and as Royer concedes the accuracy of the
District Court’s factual recitation, we will not restate the full facts of the case.
II
In essence, Royer’s complaint is that her supervisors not only failed to take
seriously her allegations that she was being sexually harassed by one of her co-workers –
first, by his unwanted sexual attention and, after she complained about that, by retaliatory
conduct including ridicule and interference with her job duties – but that they ultimately
fired her for having made those allegations. 
3The University claims that it properly terminated Royer, in accordance with the
collective bargaining agreement that governed her employment, because she received
three “warning letters” within a one-year period.  It is undisputed that: (1) Royer received
an initial warning letter on November 11, 1998 because she did not comply with the
policy requiring her to leave her keys in a campus “lock box,” despite having received
prior notice of the policy and prior complaints of her failure to comply with it; (2) Royer
received a second warning letter on February 15, 1999 because she posted on the faculty
and employee electronic message board (or “listserve”) a letter to the University President 
regarding her dismissal from the University’s occupational therapy program, despite
having received two prior warnings that she would be disciplined if she did not restrict
her use of the listserve to employment-related issues; and (3) Royer received a third and
final warning letter on May 5, 1999 after a hidden surveillance camera recorded her
looking at papers on her supervisor’s desk without authorization while she was supposed
to be cleaning his office.
Because the University articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
action, the burden shifted to Royer to produce sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable jury could reject the proffered explanation and find the termination a pretext
for discriminatory action.  McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.  Although Royer
attempts to satisfy this burden by claiming that the factual predicates for the first two
warning letters “are suggestive of such irregularity as to easily support a reasonable
4inference of pretext,” App’t Br. at 17, the record evidence she cites does not provide an
adequate basis for a reasonable factfinder to reject the University’s proffered explanation
for her termination.  For example, although Royer claims (without apparent evidentiary
support) that the co-worker about whose harassment she had complained may have taken
the key to the lock box to prevent her from leaving her keys inside it, this charge of
sabotage is untenable in light of Royer’s concession that she knew of prior occasions on
which that key was missing and that she had been issued her own key to the lock box. 
Royer’s charge that her supervisor “overreached and/or outright manufactured bases upon
which to discipline her” by issuing the second warning letter for actions that “had nothing
whatsoever to do with her employment,” rings similarly hollow in light of the fact that she
had twice been warned not to use the computer system for issues unrelated to her
employment and had been explicitly told she would face “disciplinary action” if she did
not comply with these warnings.  Not only does this history show Royer’s action to have
been insubordinate, the issuance of multiple warnings prior to taking disciplinary action is
flatly inconsistent with her claim that the base for the warning letter was “manufactured.”
There is, quite simply, no evidence to suggest that any of the warning letters were
issued in order to retaliate against Royer for her complaints of sexual harassment.  In fact,
Royer’s only argument that the University’s disciplinary actions were tied to her
complaints of harassment appears to be her claim that John Luchini, the supervisor “who
did not take Plaintiff’s complaints of discriminatory harassment seriously,” either issued
or “participated in” the issuance of each warning letter.  There is, of course, nothing
sinister about Luchini’s having been involved in each warning letter; he was, after all,
Royer’s boss.   Thus, Royer’s argument for pretext boils down to the single allegation that
Luchini did not take her complaints of sexual harassment seriously.  Regardless of
whether this is true, there is no evidence from which a jury could find any link between
Luchini’s response to Royer’s allegations and his issuance of warning letters for improper
conduct that Royer admittedly engaged in. 
III
Because Royer failed to satisfy her burden of producing evidence sufficient to
demonstrate that the University’s  proffered reason for her termination was pretext, we
will affirm the District Court’s decision granting summary judgment for the defendant. 
